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of the criminal and the protection of the innocent. 27 There can be
little doubt that whichever approach ultimately prevails, this aim,
a constant goal in the field of the protection of individual rights, assures the continued use of the defense of entrapment.
NICHOLAS W. BATH

THE COMMON LAW WIFE
AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
In recent years Indiana, through legislative enactment and
judicial decision, has been developing and voicing a dislike for the
common-law marriage.' In 1957 this attitude culminated in legislation abolishing common-law marriage in the state.2 For ten years
prior to this abolition, however, Indiana's Workmen's Compensation
Act contained a provision which, as interpreted in the case of Stoner
v. Howard Sober, Inc.,3 appears to have resulted in a denial of equal
protection of the laws.

In the Stoner case, Mrs. Stoner, a party to a common-law marriage
of four years, ten months, and nineteen days, was denied compensation after the accidental death of her husband because she failed to

satisfy a requirement of section 40-1403a of the Indiana Workmen's
Compensation Act, which provides in part as follows:

"Total dependency-The following persons are conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased
employee and shall constitute the class known as presumptive

dependents in the preceding section:
2IThe Court in Sherman said: "To determine whether entrapment has been
established, a line must be drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent and
the trap for the unwary criminal." Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
The concurring opinion contained these words: "[I]n holding out inducements they
[police] should act in such a manner as is likely to induce to the commission of
crime only these persons (criminals] and not others who would normally avoid
crime and through self-struggle resist ordinary temptations." Id. at 384.
1
The great weight of modern American authority on the subject supports and
advocates this shift away from recognizing common-law marriages. The American
Bar Association, the Commission on Uniform State Laws, and almost every authority in the field of social reform favors the abolition of the institution of common-law
marriage. i Vernier, American Family Laws § 26 at io8 (1931). For a more detailed discussion of this shift see note 22 infra.
2
"All marriages known as 'common law marriages' entered into subsequent to
the effective date of this act shall be and the same are hereby declared null and void."
Ind. Acts 1957, ch. 78, § I.
8149 N.E.2d 121 (Ind. App. Ct. 1958).
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(a) A wife upon a husband with whom she is living at the time
of his death, or upon whom the laws of the state impose the
obligation of her support at such time. The term 'wife' as used
in this subsection shall exclude a common-law wife unless such
common-law relationship shall have existed openly and notoriously for a period of not less than five [5] years immediately preceding the death."4
The Indiana Industrial Board 5 found that Mrs. Stoner's commonlaw marriage, contracted on March 19, 1946, had not existed "openly
and notoriously" for five years immediately prior to her husband's
death on February 9, 1951, and therefore she was not entitled to an
award of compensation. The case was appealed three times.6 Each
time compensation was denied. In each of the three hearings, appellant's counsel attempted to challenge the constitutionality of section
4o-14oga, claiming that it denied Mrs. Stoner equal protection of the

laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution 7 and article I of the Indiana Constitution.8 The court
in the principal case refused to allow the constitutional question to be
raised, stating that appellant lacked standing to thus challenge the section. 9 The court further stated that "the rights and duties provided in
the Workmen's Compensation Act are contractual in nature and arise
out of the voluntary acceptance of the terms thereof on the part of the
employer and the employee.' 10 Having agreed to the section as a provi'Ind. Ann. Stat. § 4o-s4o3a (Bums' 1952 Replacement). (Emphasis added).
8
"The industrial board shall have immediate charge of the administration
of the provisions of the workmen's compensation act [§§ 40-1201-40-1414, 40-150340-1704] and such other duties as are hereinafter prescribed in this act [§§4o-2lo4a,
40-2105, 40-21o8]." Ind. Ann. Stat. § 4o-2iosa (Bums' 1952 Replacement).
eMrs. Stoner appealed the original award of the Industrial Board denying her
compensation. The Indiana Appellate Court found the Board's conclusion that
claimant was not a dependent within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation
Act insufficient to support the award, in that it did not exclude every possibility of
recovery. The cause was remanded for further proceedings. Stoner v. Howard Sober,
Inc., 124 Ind. App. 581, 118 N.E.2d 5o4 (1954). On remand, the Board made the
same findings of fact and conclusions of law that were deemed surplusage in the first
appeal. The case was reversed and remanded again, with directions to make specific findings of fact as to the actual dependency of the claimant. Stoner v. Howard
Sober, Inc., 141 N.E.2d 458 (Ind. App. Ct. 1957). In the determination in question,
which was the third appeal, the amended and expanded award of the Board was
affirmed, even though the claimant was still denied compensation. Stoner v. Howard
Sober, Inc., 149 N.E.2d 121 (Ind. App. Ct. 1958).
7"No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
8"The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens,
privileges or immunities which, ufion the same terms, shall not equally belong to
all citizens." Ind. Const. art. I, § 23.
'149 N.E.2d at 123.
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sion of his contract with his employer, the decedent "would be in no
position to challenge his own voluntary agreement as depriving him
of his constitutional rights; and, as appellant acquires any rights
she may possess as a dependent of the decedent solely under and by
virtue of his said contract, she, too, is in no position to challenge said
contract as depriving her of the asserted constitutional right.""
In effect the court held that the decedent, by contractually agreeing to section 40-1403a of the Act, waived his wife's derivative right
to challenge the section as denying her equal protection of the laws.
Ordinarily an individual can waive any right which has been pro12
vided for his benefit either by contract, by statute, or by constitution.
"To constitute a 'waiver' there must be generally, first, an existing
right, benefit, or advantage; secondly, knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right, benefit, or advantage; and,
lastly, an actual intention to relinquish it, or such conduct as warrants an inference of relinquishment."' 13 Thus it is possible to waive
voluntarily and intentionally an existing constitutional right, as long
as such a waiver is not against public policy.1 4 It is doubtful, however,
under the facts of the principal case, whether there was an existing
right which decedent could effectively waive. Nowhere in the report
is there any mention of the date on which the decedent voluntarily
contracted and elected to accept and to be bound by the provisions
of the Workmen's Compensation Act. If the contract under the Act
was made prior to the contract of marriage, then any waiver resulting
from the former contract and relating to the rights of the parties to
the marriage would be a waiver of a non-existent right, rather than
an effective waiver of an existing right. The court not only fails to discuss the possibility of there being such an ineffective waiver, but it also
"Ibid.
"Gilman v. Butzloff, 155 Fla. 888, 22 So. 2d 263, 265 (1945); Kempa v. State,
58 N.E.2d 934, 935 (Ind.1945); Brown v. State, 219 Ind. 251, 37 N.E.2d 73, 77 (1941);
Bachelor v. State, 189 Ind. 69, 125 N.E. 773, 776 (1920); Lamb v. Davis, 56 N.W.2d
481, 483 (Iowa 1953); Hittson v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 43 N.M. 122, 86 P.2d 1037,
1o39 (1939); Cameron v. McDonald, 216 N.C. 712, 6 S.E.ad 497, 499 (1940).
"Cliett v. Williams, 97 S.V.2d 272, 274 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936). (Emphasis added).
Accord, San Bernadino Inv. Co. v. Merrill, io8 Cal. 490, 41 Pac. 487, 488 (1895);
National Parafine Oil Co. v. Chappellet, 4 Cal. App. 5o5, 88 Pac. 506, 507 (1906);
Jonas v. City of W. Palm Beach, 76 Fla. 66, 79 So. 438, 441 (1918); State v. City of
Anaconda, 41 Mont. 577, 111 Pac. 345, 347 (1910).
""It is a general rule that any right or privilege to which a person is legally
entitled, whether secured by contact, conferred by statute, or guaranteed by the
constitution, may be waived by him; provided it is intended for his sole benefit,
and does not infringe upon the rights of others, and such waiver is not against
public policy." Hittson v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 43 N.M. 122, 86 P.2d 1037, 1039
(1939).
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ignores the principle that "a State can not grant a privilege subject
to the agreement that the grantee will surrender a constitutional right,
even in those cases where the State has the unqualified power to
withhold the grant altogether."'15 Thus there seems to be some question as to whether the court was correct when it stated that decedent
contractually waived his 'right, and thereby appellant's right, to
challenge the constitutionality of the provision. For the remainder of
this comment it will be assumed that the decedent did not effectively
waive his constitutional right and that Mrs. Stoner, by virtue of her
position as widow of the decedent, has the right to challenge the
constitutionality of section 40-14o3a.
In 1947 the Indiana Legislature enacted section 40-14o3a to introduce an element of certainty into the awarding of compensation to
common-law wives, and to reduce the possibility of recovery by a party
to a meretricious union.' 6 The purpose of this section was not to discriminate between one legal wife and another legal wife, but instead it
was to insure that the common-law relationship was genuine, not
merely transitory and meretricious.' 7 At first glance section 4o-14o3a
seems well designed to achieve this purpose, but upon reconsideration
it appears that in addition to achieving its stated purpose, the section also: (z) effects a result that is clearly contrary to the acknowledged
purpose of workmen's compensation acts, (2)elevates a mere matter of difficulty of proof into a position of public policy, and (3).contains a classification that is apparently unconstitutional.
As announced by the Indiana Appellate Court in In re Duncan 8s
the general underlying purpose of that state's Workmen's Compensation Act is to place the economic burden and loss arising from the
injury to an employee on the employer and his consumers, rather
than on the dependents of the injured employee. In fact, the title
of the Indiana Act itself states that one of its purposes is "to provide compensation for injuries and death of employees resulting
from" accidents arising out of and in the course of their employment. 19 The effect of section 40-14o3a, which denies compensation to
a common-law wife unless she has lived "openly and notoriously" with
her husband for five years immediately prior to his death, is dearly
opposed to this acknowledged purpose. The section makes it impossible for a common-law wife, whose marriage is of less than five years
1City of Alexandria v. Texas Co., 172 Va. 2o9, 1 S.E.2d 296, 299 (1939).
"Note, 32 Ind. L.J. 99, io8 (196).
17
Guevara v. Inland Steel Co', i9o Ind. App. 47, 88 N.Ead 398, 401 (1949).
"s73 Ind. App. 270, x7 N.E. 289, 291 (192o).
1

9See Title, Ind. Acts 1929, ch. 172.
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duration, to recover an award as a presumptive dependent. Such a
wife, and not industry, is burdened with the economic loss resulting
from her husband's death.
The Indiana Act, prior to the passage of section 40-1403a, made
no distinction between wives based upon the type or duration of their
marriage. 20 A common-law wife was allowed to recover when her
marriage was established by that weight of evidence required for the
proving of a common-law marriage under other circumstances. The
recognized difficulty involved in proving such a marriage was one
of the factors which initially led to the passage of this section, and
then in turn to the complete abolition of common-law marriage in
1957. Prior to this abolition Indiana recognized common-law marriage, 2' although somewhat reluctantly in recent years. 22 This recognition was in line with the accepted policy of encouraging marriage.23
In Teter v. Teter, the Indiana Appellate Court made the following
'Guevara v. Inland Steel Co., 120 Ind. App. 47, 88 N.E.2d 398, 401 (1949).
"No marriage shall be void or voidable for the want of license or other formality required by law, if either of the parties thereto believed it to be a legal marriage at the time." Ind. Ann. Stat. § 44-302 (Burns' 1952 Replacement). Prior to
1957, the courts of Indiana consistently recognized the validity of common-law
marriages. Anderson v. Anderson, 235 Ind. 113, 131 N.E.2d 3oi (1956); Bolkovac v.
State, 229 Ind. 294, 98 N.E.2d 250 (1951); Schumacher v. Adams County Circuit
Court, 225 Ind. 200, 73 N.E.2d 689 (1947); Cossell v. Cossell, 223 Ind. 6o3, 63
N.E.2d 540 (1945); Norrell v. Norrell, 220 Ind. 398, 44 N.E.2d 97 (1942); Argiroff
v. Argiroff, 215 Ind. 297, 19 N.E.2d 56o (1939); United States Steel Corp. v. Weatherton, 126 Ind. App. 189, 131 N.E.2d 335 (1956); In re Dittman's Estate, 124 Ind.
App. 198, 115 N.E.2d 125 (1953); Guevara v. Inland Steel Co., 12o Ind. App. 47,
88 N.E.2d 398 (1949); Schilling v. Parsons, iio Ind. App. 52, 36 N.E.2d 958 (1941);
Vincennes Bridge Co. v. Vardaman, 91 Ind. App. 363, 171 N.E. 241 (1930).
2 The shift in Indiana's attitude toward common-law marriage, from one of
ready recognition and acceptance to one of reluctance and growing distaste, reflects the general trend in the United States. Although Lord Hardwicke's Act, 26
Geo. 2, c. 33 (1753), requiring publicity and a regular ceremony for the creation of
the marital relation in England, was passed prior to the American Revolution, most
of the original colonies, as well as the states which subsequently joined the Union,
adopted the earlier policy of giving recognition to these informal, consensual marriages. The reason for this recognition can be seen in the character of the United
States during its early years. The country was sparsely populated, the communities
were few and far between, and the availability of persons authorized to solemnize
marriage was limited. As late as 1931, a majority of the states still recognized commonlaw marriages. As of 1958, with the abolition of common-law marriage in Indiana
in 1957, only eighteen states and the District of Columbia still recognized them. It
is generally felt that the factors which led to the recognition of common-law marriage are no longer existent. For a complete history of the common-law marriage
see Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 2 Hagg. Const. 54, 67-72, 161 Eng. Rep. 665, 668-72
(1811). See also Keezer, Marriage and Divorce § 28 (3 d ed. 1946); 2 Pollack and
Maitland, History of English Law 369-74 (2d ed. 1923); 1 Vernier, American Family
Laws § 26 at 102-10 (1931).
3Meister v. Moore, 96 US. 76, 81 (1877).
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statement: "The want of form, or the lack of ceremonial rites, does not
impair a marriage contract, in cases where it is entered into from good
motives and with an intention to contract a present marriage, and is
'24
followed by an open acknowledgement of the marital relation.
In a later decision,25 the Indiana Supreme Court, in referring to the
importance of cohabitatidn in the contracting of a marriage per
verba de praesenti, stated that "cohabitation does not of itself consti20
tute a common-law marriage. It is merely evidence of marriage...."
If cohabitation is merely "evidence of marriage," a requirement of
five years open and notorious cohabitation does not appear to be based
upon sound principles, for "at each particular moment in the existence
of a person, he must either be married or single; there is no intermediate position." 27 In enacting a provision requiring a five year
period of cohabitation, the Indiana Legislature did not intend to
redefine common-law marriage.28 Instead it intended to introduce some
fixed standard of measurement into the proving of a common-law
marriage entitling the surviving spouse to recover under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 29 In fixing a standard it appears that the
legislature was somewhat overzealous. While it is quite true that
there often are great difficulties involved in proving the existence
of common-law marriages and that occasionally false claims may
go undetected, public policy does not seem to require the barring
of all claims, whether fraudulent or honest, based upon such
marriages where the period of cohabitation is less than five years.
"The institution and maintenance of suits for false claims is recognized, but' to what extent in comparison with honest ones is not a
matter of judicial notice; nor is it a matter of such notice in what
measure false claims are successful. To hold that all honest claims
should be barred merely because otherwise some dishonest ones
will prevail is not enough to make out a case of public policy."80
While it appears that the effect of section 40-14o3a leaves much
to be desired, and that the stated purpose of this statute has been
5,

"mioInd. 129 (1884), cited with approval in Schilling v. Parsons, nio Ind. App.
36 N.E.d 958, 96x (1941).
wMeehan v. Edward Valve & Mfg. Co., 65 Ind. App. 342, 117 N.E. 265 (1917).

&Id.at 266 (Emphasis added).
'1 Bishop, Marriage, Divorce, and Separation § 317 (1891).
Mrhe five year requirement was not intended to modify the law on what constitutes a common law marriage. Guevara v. Inland Steel Co., i2o Ind. App. 47,
88 N.E.2d 398, 401 (1949).

"See note 16 supra.
sChiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H.
543

(103o). (Emphasis added).

529,

i5o At. 54o,
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overstepped, these observations cannot be made the basis for constitutional objection. There does, however, seem to be a constitutional
objection to the section on the ground that it contains an unconstitutional classification. An excellent definition of what constitutes a
valid classification was made by the Indiana Supreme Court in Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough:
"The legislature may make a classification for legislative purposes, but it must have some reasonable basis upon which to
stand ....Such legislation must not only operate equally upon
all within the class, but the classification must furnish a reason
for and justify the making of the class ....Not only must the
classification treat all brought under its influence alike, under
the same conditions, but it must embrace all of the class to
which it is naturally related. Neither mere isolation nor arbitrary selection is proper classification."3 1
To all appearances, the classification in section 4o-14oa fails to comply
with these criteria.
In order to facilitate the administration of its Workmen's Compensation Act, Indiana has created a classification based entirely upon
the type and duration of a marriage, while generally no distinction is
made on such a basis.3 2 "In the United States there are no degrees
or differences in marriage. The denial in many states of validity to
a common-law marriage and the acceptance of that form by others
still leaves unchanged the status once recognized of any union no matter how contracted. A marriage in America is full and complete in
every respect or it does not exist at all."'33 A wife is a wife, and a marriage is a marriage, and it is immaterial whether the relation is founded
in ceremony or in mutual consent alone. Certainly the Indiana Legislature would not attempt to classify wives according to their height,
their weight, or the color of their hair. It has classified them according
to the type and duration of their marriages, which seems just as
capricious a classification. If common-law marriages are recognized,
as they were in Indiana until 1957, then a wife's common-law marriage
ought to have all the incidents of a ceremonial marriage. Once common-law marriages are recognized, there is no rational basis for dis2168 Ind. 671, 8o N.E.

529

(1907).

"An extensive search of the Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns' 1952 Replacement) fails to
reveal any similar distinction being drawn in the titles dealing with decedent estates,
descent, husband and wife, wills, bequests and devise, or probate.
mBlack, Common Law Marriages, 2 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 113, 127 (1928). (Emphasis
added). In this article Mr. Black makes a spirited defense of common-law marriage,
and presents a comprehensive summary of the atttitude toward these marriages in
1928.
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tinguishing between a common-law marriage of four years, ten months,
and nineteen days, and one of five years. In fact, there is no rational
basis for distinguishing between a common-law marriage and a ceremonial marriage of the same duration. No period of cohabitation is
required before a wife whose marriage is founded in ceremony is entitled to recover under the Act. 34 To require a period of cohabitation
of a common-law wife is clearly prejudicial to her interests. A right
should not be afforded one wife and denied another wife when
their marriages are equally valid,35 their children are equally legitimate,36 and they equally inherit from their deceased spouses. 37 The
Indiana Legislature has taken one natural class, composed of ceremonial and common-law wives, and split it into two parts. It has then
designated these two parts as two classes, and proceeded to legislate
against one of these parts. If the Legislature looked upon common-law
marriages with great disfavor and felt they were a fruitful source of
perjury and fraud,38 then it should have abolished them in 1947
instead of attempting to regulate them through an apparently unconstitutional classification. It is clearly within the power of the Indiana Legislature to abolish common-law marriage, 39 but it is not
within its power to establish arbitrary and discriminatory marriage
classifications.
Thus it appears that the provisions of section 40-1403a of the
Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act are open to question on several grounds. The effect of the classification made in this section is
clearly contra to the generally accepted purpose of workmen's compensation 'acts. While the difficulty of proof may mean that false
claimants can be successful, this is not a sufficient reason to justify
"Ind. Ann. Stat. § 40-14o3a (Burns' 1952 Replacement).
w'It is also held that the contracting parties to a common-law marriage are
husband and wife as fully and to the same effect and extent as if there had been
a statutory and ceremonial marriage...." Dunlop v. Dunlop, sol Ind.App. 43, 198

N.E. 95, 98 (1935)w'The parties to such marriage [common-law] are husband and wife and their
legal status is that of married persons; their children are legitimate .. " Baker v.
Mays & Mays, 199 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946). Accord, Monroe v. Middle
Ad. Transp. Co., 85 N.E.2d 8oi (Ohio C. App. 1949); Umbenhower v. Labus, 85
Ohio St. 238, 97 N.E. 852 (1912).
,See note 32 supra.
'Anderson v. Anderson, 2s5 Ind. 113, 131 N.E.2d 3o, 3o5 (1956), adopting
the language in In re Dittman's Estate, 115 N.E.2d 125, 13o (Ind.App. Ct. 1953).

The marriage relationship, regardless of whether the source of such relationship was common-law or ceremonial, is of such vital concern to society, the public,
and the state, that it is subject to legislative control and regulation. Pry v. Pry, 225
Ind. 458, 75 N.E.2d 909, 913 (1947); Sweigart v. State, 213 Ind. 157, 12 N.E.2d 134, 18
(1938); Wiley v. Wiley, 75 Ind.App. 456, 123 N.E. 252, 255 (1919).

